This essay examines some properties of the Single Transferable Vote (Hare Voting) procedure for electing candidates in multi-member districts under the assumption that all voters are strategic. From the perspective of the most common criterion for evaluating voting procedures -the extent to which they ensure the eventual selection of Condorcet winning candidates -the results we offer in this essay can be interpreted as indictments of STY. Even if we restrict preferences by imposing conditions on attitudes towards risk and assume a strong form of separability, STY is not necessarily incentive compatible and strategic voting does not ensure the selection of Condorcet winning candidates or of Condorcet outcomes. This fact, moreover is not dependent on the existence of "bogus" equilibria -outcomes that exclude Condorcet candidates cannot be avoided under all circumstances even if we limit our analysis to strong or to individually stable equilibria.
Some Properties of Hare Voting with Strategic Voters

I. Introduction
American politics are complicated by the necessity, under the winner-take-all format of single member districts, for drawing district boundaries to achieve "fair representation" in multi-ethnic and multi-racial polities. The conflicts that arise in this context and the opportunities for lawyers to profitably enter the debate are well known and make it reasonable to search for alternative election procedures. One such alternative is Hare voting or STY (the single transferable vote), which seeks to achieve fairness in the form of proportional representation without necessitating the construction of artificial district boundaries.
Although used on occasion in local contexts, STY has not gained widespread acceptance, in part because it can be difficult to implement in large electorates without computer-aided tabulation technologies and because of the elitist view that electorates are not intellectually equipped to contend with STY's internal mechanics and lengthy ballots. There is, though, another reason for STY's minimal implementation --the existence of examples in which STY exhibits some undesirable properties. Specifically, Daron and Kronick (1977) show that STY violates monotonicity --that an increase in first place votes can disadvantage a candidate --while Brams and Fishburn (1984) offer examples to illustrate that STY need not ensure the selection of a Condorcet winner.
Monotonicity and a guarantee that Condorcet winners are selected are important criteria with which to evaluate any election procedure. Thus, existing research appears to provide a powerful argument against STY's use or for preferring it over other procedures a priori. But the arguments offered by this research are less than compelling since they fail to consider the possibility that voters might act strategically so as to ensure the selection of Condorcet winners. In this essay, then, we explore some of the properties of Hare voting when voters are strategic. We should state at the outset, however, that, owing to STY's strategic complexity, our formal results are limited to some special cases and counter-examples. Nevertheless, our results allow us to formulate informed conjectures about STY's properties.
STY and some Preliminaries
We begin by introducing some essential notation and with a description of STY in terms of a 5-step algorithm. Letting n be the number of ballots (voters in this analysis since we assume that all enfranchised citizens vote), n i be the number of voters with type j preferences, and C ={a, b. c, ... ) be the set of candidates, suppose m < k candidates are to be elected or, equivalently, that k candidates compete to fill m seats. Then, following Hoag and Hallett's description ( 1926) iii unless all committee positions are filled.
To see the source of our concern over STV's ability to select Condorcet winners if such a winner exists, suppose k = 4, C = (a.b.c.d) and suppose an electorate of 99 voters is evenly divided across the three preference orders as shown in Example I. Of course, this example does not establish the superiority of other procedures. If the alternative to STY is three single-member districts, and if each of the above preference orders corresponds to a district, then each district will unanimously elect a candidate other than d. Thus, whether an overall Condorcet winner is elected in a single member district system can depend on how district boundaries are drawn.
It is unclear, then, whether the failure to choose the Condorcet candidate is always "a bad thing," since we are hard pressed to identify a "better" outcome than (a,b,c Example 5
The problem with such examples, though, is the presumption that voting is sincere. Merely applying a procedure to some fixed set of preferences assumes that voters cast ballots consistent with those preferences, whereas Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) A route out of our problem is to assume that preferences are defined over C --thereby allowing a "clean" definition of sincere voting --but to suppose also that there are restrictions on preferences over the elements of Cm. Specifically, letting P denote strict preference (throughout this essay we simplify matters by assuming that all preferences are strict), consider the following restriction:
, where c, c' EC and C, C' E Cm, then C PC' iff c Pc'.
For example, if m = 2 and k = 3, then {a,b) P {a,c) P {b,c), if and only if a Pb Pc. Notice that if m = k-l, R l completely constrains the relationship between preferences over Cm and those over C, whereas if l < m < k-l, some latitude remains in this relationship. For example, if a Pb Pc Pd, then (b,c) P {a,d) and {a,d) P {b,c) are both allowed.
If we allow all preference profiles over C, then with or without RI, all preference profiles over
Cm are admissible and it would appear that Gibbard and Satterthwaite's result applies to establish that insincere voting cannot be precluded a priori. But we have not yet considered a second complicating factor, namely that the set of outcomes also includes lotteries over Cm. If a final outcome corresponds to a tie between two or more candidates and if ties are broken by impartial devices such as coin tosses, then the actual domain of outcomes includes the lotteries over Cm that such devices allow. Thus, we ought to ask whether there are any restrictions over preferences for such lotteries in the form of attitudes towards risk that negate the imperatives of any general manipulability result.
The answer to this question is that in general there is no such restriction, but it is nevertheless useful to consider one restriction in particular, because it facilitates the distinction among alternative cases later. That restriction is:
R2: A voter is said to be risk averse if the next-to-last-preferred outcome is preferred to an equi-probable lottery over Ckci· That is, letting c_i = C -{c;), and letting the subscript i denote a candidate's rank in the voter's preference order, then that voter is said to be risk
We emphasize that R2 is severe. For example, if preferences are separable --if
which requires that the utility difference between a voter's first and second ranked candidates "overwhelms" the combined differences between the second ranked candidate and all remaining candidates.
Throughout the remainder of this essay, we restrict our formal analysis --but not our examples --to the special case of m = k-1 = 2. We understand that such a restriction does not allow for a general analysis, but this narrow domain is nevertheless sufficient for our purposes --our results are largely negative and there is no reason to suppose that STY's properties improve as larger values of k and m are considered. That is, if STY has complex and undesirable properties when m = k -1 = 2, we should assume that those properties pervade all STY systems.
Sincerity as a Nash Equilibrium
We proceed now by noting that the usual analyses of STY take one of two approaches. First, it is shown that applying STY to some fixed set of preferences (ostensibly, sincere preferences) produces one type of outcome or another (c.f., Merrill 1984, Doron and Kronick 1977) . Alternatively, after postulating preferences and determining the outcome that prevails under sincerity, it is shown how defections from sincerity to insincerity can change the outcome to the benefit of those who defect (c.f. Fishburn and Brams 19xx). Thus, if voters are allowed to be strategic, the first approach yields valid interpretations of STV's potential consequences only if sincerity is a Nash equilibrium. The second approach is valid only if the defections considered are the only ones that will be made by strategic voters --only if the new assumed strategies are an equilibrium. What we propose, then, is to explore the circumstances under which these implicit assumptions are valid.
We turn first to the issue of determining the circumstances under which sincerity is a Nash equilibrium. Let Vi denote the number of voters who most prefer candidate i, let Vi ih denote the number of voters who prefer i to j to h, and let Wi be defined as before. Then Result 1 (which we prove in the appendix), establishes that while there can be circumstances under which sincerity is a Nash equilibrium, there are also circumstances in even a very limited context under which it cannot be an equilibrium:
if R2 is satisfied, then a voter who prefers i P j Ph will defect from the strategy n tuple "everyone votes sincerely" if and only if Vi> q, and V i , Vh < q for the remaining two candidates, with
where 6 2: -I depends on i's excess votes and the portion of these votes transferred to
if R2 is not satisfied. the set of preferences that do not allow sincerity to be a Nash equilibrium expands to include those situations in which Vi = q and V i , V h < q.
One unsurprising implication of Result 1 is that there exists ordinal preferences such that "all voters vote sincerely" is not a Nash equilibrium. In Example 3, with m = 2 and q = 34, if any voter who most prefers a to b to c defects unilaterally from sincerity, the outcome is (a,b) rather than a lottery between (a,b) and (a,c}. On the other hand, Result t also tells us that there is a wide range of circumstances under which "all voters vote sincerely" is a Nash equilibrium and it suggests where we might look for such equilibria in situations other than k = 3. For instance, in Example l, because all candidates but d exceed the quota, no individual has any incentive to defect from sincerity. Thus, the election of In summary, then: Sincere voting can be a Nash equilibrium in STV systems even if the equilibrium outcome fails to elect a Condorcet winning candidate; and this fact does not depend on examples in which no voter is pivotal or in which voters fail to eliminate (weakly) dominated strategies.
Insincerity and Condorcet Winners
As our summary statement indicates, we are not interested in sincere versus insincere voting for its own sake. Rather, our interest derives from the desire to gain some sense of the circumstances under which STV systems are likely to elect Condorcet winners in the event that such winners exist.
But Result I also leads us to conjecture that as the number of candidates increases beyond 3, the incentives for insincerity will expand. Even if strong assumptions such as R2 are satisfied, as k grows, the opportunities for making or breaking ties among those candidates not elected on the first ballot will increase, and it is precisely these opportunities that induce voters to cast insincere ballots.
This fact, then, raises a new question. Specifically, if voters find it in their interest to vote insincerely, will such voting ensure the election of Condorcet winning candidates?
Unfortunately, Example 5 reveals that the answer to this question is no --indeed, strategic voting can lead away from the selection of a Condorcet winner. Ignoring the preferences in parentheses, if everyone votes sincerely, a is elected because its vote, 35, exceeds the quota of 34 --at which point bis elected because its share of a's excess vote exceeds e' s share, thereby breaking the tie between c and b in favor of b. So the Condorcet winner, b, is elected in a sincere ballot. Now, however, consider the incentives to be strategic. Some simple algebra establishes that expression(!) in Result 1 is satisfied only for voters who prefer a to c to b, so only they have an incentive to defect from sincere voting. In particular, if any such voter casts a ballot that ranks c first, a is elected again but has no excess votes to transfer to b, in which case b is eliminated and c is elected. Moreover, if R2 is satisfied, Result 1 tells us that this new ballot profile with a single insincere voter is an equilibrium. 3 Because it is never advantageous to rank one's least preferred candidate first or second, voters of the first type know that even with strategic voting, candidate a can never be elected. Thus, each such voter should rank c first so as to elect c rather than b. That is, all "a-voters" insincerely ranking c first on their ballots, and everyone else voting sincerely" is an equilibrium.
Such examples, then, illustrate a general problem with STY. On the one hand, a great many equilibria are supported by the fact that no individual voter has a positive incentive to alter its strategy. On the other hand, these equilibria cannot be eliminated using refinements like trembling hand perfection or elimination of weakly dominated strategies, because there is always at least one circumstance in which the strategy in question is strictly preferred to all others.
We suspect, nevertheless, that such equilibria are unreasonable predictions or that they provide something less than a firm basis for evaluating election procedures. First, although each voter knows that he or she is unlikely to be pivotal, each voter also knows that its vote is irrelevant unless it is pivotal. Thus, one alternative is to restrict ourselves to examining equilibria in which at least one voter is pivotal. We call such equilibria individually stable.
Second, we know that considerable effort is directed in multi-candidate election campaigns at coordinating the actions of voters. Labor unions, newspapers, and the candidates attempt to educate voters about strategic complexities, especially when it is in their interest to do so, by telling them, for instance, how not to "waste their vote" or how voting for one candidate merely works to the advantage of some undesirable alternative. Thus, it seems reasonable to pay special heed to those equilibria that cannot be upset even if voters can successfully coordinate their actions. There are several ways to approach this second consideration. Myerson (19xx) , for instance, introduces the notion of proper equilibria to handle precisely this type of problem; but STV's complexity leaves us perplexed as to how to apply this idea. Hence, we turn instead to Aumann's (1957) notion of a strong equilibrium --a Nash equilibrium that is stable against the coordinated defections of any set of voters.
To see the problems we encounter now with ensuring the selection of a Condorcet winning candidate, consider the following fact:
Remark 1: Even if C contains a Condorcet winning candidate and even if preferences satisfy RI. it is not necessarily the case that Cm contains a Condorcet winning outcome.
Suppose individual preferences establish d as the Condorcet winner, but suppose that they also generate a cycle among candidates a, b, and c. Then if m = 2, the outcomes {a,d), {b,d), and {c,d} form a top-cycle in Cm, whereas if m = 3, then {d,a,b), {d,a,c), and {d,b,c) cycle. This is not to say, though, that we cannot induce Condorcet outcomes with appropriate preferences over candidates. If preferences over C are single peaked, then preferences over Care transitive under simple majority rule. If this transitive order is, say, I P 2 P 3, and so on, then the Condorcet outcome in Cm is
(1,2, ... , m).
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The question, now, is whether the notions of individually stable and strong equilibria can rationalize the selection of a Condorcet winning outcome when such an outcome exists. The following two preliminary results, which we state without proof owing to their limited applicability, suggest that the answer to this question is yes:
Result 2: If m = 1, then in any strong or individually stable equilibrium, the Condorcet winner is elected if such a winner exists.
Result 3: If m = 2 and k = 3, if ni 2: q for at most one candidate, if R2 is not satisfied, then sincere voting is an individually stable or a strong equilibrium only if a Condorcet winner, whenever it exists, is either elected with certainty or with some non-zero probability.
Unfortunately, a single counter-example, Example 7, dashes all hope of extending these results: Thus, no subset of voters has any incentive or means to coordinate so as bring about an outcome other than {b,c) --{b,c) corresponds to the unique strong equilibrium.
Conclusion
From the perspective of some common criteria for evaluating voting procedures, the results we offer in this essay will almost certainly be interpreted as indictments of STY. simultaneously. So equality must hold originally --that is, W; = q -1 for all i, which is a k-way tie.
6 Suppose to the contrary that Wh < q-2 or Wh s. q-2 for more than one h. Then k which is impossible. Notice now that if n is sufficiently large so that q/(W . so if the value of expression (1 ) falls in the interval [5, 0] , then the voter votes insincerely.
11.
Wb (WJ > q: The voter cannot affect the election of b (c), and it cannot improve a's chances by any insincere ballot.
Case 3: W; = q for only one candidate. There are three subcases:
i.
W• = q. From Lemmas 3, either W b = w. = q-1, in which case a sincere ballot yields an equi-probable lottery between {a,b) and {a,c} and an insincere one yields a lottery between {a,b) and {b,c} --and the voter prefer the first lottery to the second.
Alternatively, if, from Lemma 3, We= q-1 and Wb = q-2, then ranking b first yields an equi-probable lottery over all three possible outcomes. And by R2, the voter prefer the certainty of {a,c} to this lottery.
Wb = q. Switching to bac merely gives b one more vote and makes the eventual selection of a less likely.
iii.
w. = q. Switching to bac can at best elect {b,c}, whereas voting sincerely can yield {a,c).
Case 4: W; � q for two candidates. We should assume that equality holds for at least one candidate since if inequality holds no individual voter can influence the outcome and voter j in particular has no incentive to deviate from a sincere strategy. So we have three subcases:
1.
The two candidates are a and b, in which case the voter has no incentive to change its vote since (a,b) is the voter's most preferred outcome.
The two candidates are a and c. If W a= q, then switching to a ballot that orders the candidates bac can only elect b along with c --the voter's least preferred outcome. If w. = q and w. > q, then Wb < q-1 and switching to bac cannot change the outcome.
11i.
The two candidates are b and c. A sincere ballot cannot elect a, so neither can an insincere one.
